Frederick’s “Greatness” by Franchetti, Cody
International Review of Social Sciences and Humanities 
Vol. 5, No. 2 (2013), pp. 159-167 
www.irssh.com 
ISSN 2248-9010 (Online), ISSN 2250-0715 (Print) 
Frederick’s “Greatness” 
Cody Franchetti 
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Modern European Studies 
Columbia University, New York City, NY 10027 
E-mail: history@codyfranchetti.com 
 
(Received: 9-4-13 / Accepted: 12-5-13) 
 
 
Abstract 
This essay attempts to identify the various qualities that made Frederick II of Prussia’s just 
appellation ‘the Great’. Frederick employed a completely new type of rule, which was not 
only unique in the eighteenth century but also prefigured modern governance in many 
respects. Frederick personified the raison d’etat and came to exemplify the rational use of 
state power for the creation of a completely new standard of judicious kingship. As a 
visionary ruler of his day, Frederick foreshadowed modern principles of the state. To highlight 
Frederick’s innovations, the essay not only shows Frederick’s brilliant leadership in the scene 
of eighteenth-century Europe, but it also refers to rarely quoted contemporary sources; by 
doing so, the essay contrasts the prodigious divide between the crumbling culture of the 
Ancien Régime and that of Frederick’s Prussia—the former still feudal and the latter 
possessing a vision that rulers are the ‘first servants of the state’. 
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Introduction 
 
Frederick II of Prussia was arguably the most charismatic and successful ruler of the 
eighteenth century. A revolutionary figure in the realm of policy and warfare—he is credited 
for having invented Realpolitik—he was a fascinating admixture of the most disparate 
elements; his affability and ruthlessness, for some mysterious reason, did not seem to collide. 
Infinitely industrious, indefatigable, uniquely available to his people, he remains an 
inscrutable figure, full of enigmatic contradictions, despite having written the most frank 
memoires and confessions of any ruler of the Ancien Régime. In his lifetime he provoked a 
degree of praise that was reserved for nobody else in modern history, except, perhaps, Louis 
XIV. But while the latter’s admirers were exclusively French, Frederick elicited admiration 
from men all over Europe—even his enemies. We shall see why. A compelling example of 
this peculiar reverence, which he received early in his reign—since the epithet ‘the Great’ and 
‘der Einzige’ (the Unique) was given to him after just five years of rule—is in a man of 
dissatisfaction such as Lord Chesterfield, who, in a letter to his son, said of Frederick that ‘he 
is so great a man that had he lived seventeen or eighteen hundred years ago, we should have 
talked of him as we do now of your Alexanders, your Caesars, and others […].’ (Chesterfield, 
1932, p.2262-3) But Chesterfield carried it even further: in 1752, after having read Voltaire’s 
Le Siècle de Louis XIV, Chesterfield wrote to the great ‘philosophe’ himself, who at the time 
was staying with Frederick at Berlin, to suggest that he write Frederick’s own history: ‘[…] 
you have given us lately the history of the greatest King; give us now, the history of the 
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greatest and most decent man of Europe, whom I degrade in calling him King.  You have him 
everyday before your very eyes, so nothing would be easier; his glory would not require your 
poetic invention, but would be safely placed by your historical truth.’1 (Chesterfield, 1932, 
p.1928) 
 
What was the cause of such veneration?  The answer itself is simple: Frederick was a ruler of 
a completely new sort, the like of which had never been seen, and whose brand of authority 
had aspects that would not be seen in Europe until the twentieth century.  It is these new 
modes of leadership, which require close scrutiny, and that this paper shall try to examine. 
 
Frederick’s Swift Success 
 
There is evidence that even before his accession, expectations were high for Frederick: his 
father Frederick William I had left the Prussian state coffers unencumbered by the debt left by 
his own father, Frederick I, the first King of Prussia, whose prodigality in fashioning himself 
a foolish copy of Louis XIV had seriously impinged on the state finances.  Frederick William 
had remedied these blunders by constructing an efficient and frugal administration, by 
establishing a consumer tax, and by encouraging more farming with vast marshland draining. 
In fact, Frederick William had left his son a rich man. But more importantly, he forged an 
army 80,000 strong, which was the best-equipped and best-trained army in Europe. An army 
of this size in a state of just two and a half million inhabitants was remarkable, and went 
clearly beyond purely defensive needs. Frederick William concentrated all his resources on 
the militarization of Prussia to such an extent that, ‘The Prussian army [under Frederick 
William I] had become the core of the state.’ (Ritter, 1968, p.19) In fact, Voltaire’s well-
known flippant remark that ‘where some states have an army, the Prussian army has a state!’ 
was in retrospect not a quip but a literalism. 
 
When Frederick William died on May 31st 1740, the Marquis D’Argenson, member of Louis 
XV’s privy counsel, wrote in his diary about Frederick’s accession prophetically: 
 
The prince has great intelligence, merit in all directions, much application, and philosophy. 
He will do what he has to do. His rights are of a kind to need war to sustain and strengthen his 
dawning greatness in the midst of jealous enemies, neighbours who hem him in, and before an 
oppressing emperor. He will find in the arrangements of his father much opportunity for 
becoming a great power in Europe. […] Shall he [Frederick] favour his own party? Shall he 
profit by it to diminish the power of the Germanic Chief, and to aggrandize himself, the King 
of Prussia? […] All his political forces will go to diminishing the vicious power of the Chief 
of the Germanic body, and making that body thrive on the fragments of its head; which would 
bring more power, more resistant force, more solidity, and no connivance at any time against 
the power and grandeur of the House of France. Hence I conclude that the closest alliance of 
the King of Prussia should be a maxim with us and that he should remain, or become, more 
our friend that our enemy during his whole reign. 
(D’Argenson, 1901, p.223-225) 
 
Lord Acton wrote of D’Argenson that ‘there was more divination in him than any other voice 
in France at that time’ and that ‘D’Argenson heralded events’ (Acton, 2000, p.17). He was not 
wrong: D’Argenson’s insight reaches just short of prophesying Frederick’s invasion of 
Silesia, which was to occur—startling less percipient observers—just a few months later. 
 
The invasion of Austrian Silesia in December 1740 is considered by historians a watershed 
date, since for the first time, the Holy Roman Empire was attacked by one of its own 
constituents. Its sanctity, it seemed, had been violated irretrievably. In reality, the inviolability 
of the empire had ceased, at least in theory, back in 1648 with the Treaty of Westphalia. One 
of the provisions of the treaty was that sovereign principalities within the empire could lend 
their armies for mercenary purposes to any power, so, theoretically, even against the empire 
                                                 
1The letter is in French. 
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itself. This was of course unimaginable in 1648; but the treaty would deal a veritable blow to 
the hitherto-uncontested preeminence of the Hapsburgs, for it became a matter of time for a 
potentate to take advantage of the new provision at the expense of the emperor. If we pay 
close attention to the words of D’Argenson in the same diary entry, we can infer that the 
challenge to the millenary structure of the Reich was up, for more powers than one were 
vying for its leadership: 
 
To whom will the succession of the empire fall? […] on the death of the Emperor (which 
shall happen after a few attacks of apoplexy2), by what pretext of a right of succession can 
Frederick aggrandize himself without Bavaria and Saxony claiming still more of the spoils, 
they who have such potent rights to its inheritance?  Still, it is to his interest that these two 
rivals should make themselves powerful at the cost of the Emperor. 
(D’Argenson, 1901, p.224)  
 
The problem of the empire’s succession had been one that emperor Charles VI had been 
preparing for since 1713, when, having only produced female heirs, he issued the Pragmatic 
Sanction, which gave the right of succession to his daughter Maria Theresa. The history of the 
Pragmatic Sanction is as complex as the empire onto which Charles tried to impose it. With 
its thousands of principalities and autonomous territories, many remonstrated at becoming 
vassals of a female: the empire, since its inception in 962 had always followed Salic law, 
precluding female inheritance. In the case of Prussia, Frederick William I, who had always 
been faithful to the emperor, accepted the provision; but in the 1720’s Charles failed to fulfill 
some territorial promises and a brief period of alienation followed; it was not a break or a real 
breach of the king’s vassalage toward the emperor—for that was inconceivable to Frederick 
William—but nevertheless it made him less willing to accept an anomalous provision such as 
the Pragmatic Sanction, so, for a while he reneged on it. Eventually however, he accepted it 
along other European powers. But at the death of Charles VI on the 20th of October 1740, 
Bavaria, Saxony, France, and crucially, Prussia contested Maria Theresa’s claims.   
 
The Invasion of Silesia: Its Practical and Symbolic Success  
 
The death of Emperor Charles VI was the excuse Frederick was waiting for.  In December he 
invaded Silesia meeting almost no resistance, partly because Frederick, in a show of his 
characteristic pragmatism, knew that two thirds of the province were Protestant and detested 
the Catholic Hapsburg’s constant meddling in their religious affairs. ‘The whole land rejoices 
at our arrival,’ Frederick wrote to his brother, ‘and is only afraid that we shall leave.’ (quoted 
in Gooch, 1947, p.15) In effect, Frederick did have a legitimate claim to Silesia, dating back 
to 1537, but it was a very loose claim that had never been ratified by Vienna. So despite his 
assertions to the contrary, Frederick’s move was dictated purely by ‘reasons of state’, for 
Silesia was the richest province of the Empire; it accounted for 25% of its total revenue, 
which was mostly due to its profitable textile industry and superior commercial waterways. 
Frederick’s move was so bold that a century later Otto von Bismarck declared that, ‘Frederick 
the Great stole Silesia, yet he is one of the greatest men of all time.’ (Gooch, 1947, p.13) The 
King of Prussia’s effrontery was not shocking just to contemporary Austrian observers: 
 
The King of Prussia, before the manifestoes and declarations which usually precede a war, 
had inundated Silesia with his troops; he admitted it afterwards, when he was assured of his 
prey. The other belligerent powers had recourse to another method; they covered all Europe 
with manifestoes, calling heaven as a witness of the justice of their claims on the inheritance 
of Maria Theresa; then, they took up arms. 
(Du Plessis, 1903, p.157) 
 
These words, written in 1741 by the Duc de Richelieu, demonstrate the gulf between 
Frederick and the majority of men in official posts in the eighteenth century. Richelieu, the 
                                                 
2
 D’Argenson’s astonishing predictive qualities are again manifest in this entry of June 11, 1740 quoted 
above: emperor Charles VI died two months later. 
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great-grandson of the famous cardinal, was a good military leader who served valiantly under 
the Marechal de Saxe in the only unequivocal victory of France under the reign of Louis XV 
(the battle of Fontenoy in 1745 against Austria and Britain). But despite being a man of 
action, Richelieu was a man anchored in the past. According to him then, Frederick’s 
annexation of Silesia was brazen if not insolent, which makes the juxtaposition of the new, 
vigorous, practicality of Frederick against the overly ceremonious and laggard deportment of 
the French obvious; and it is almost comical to read Richelieu’s complaining that Frederick 
had not announced his Silesian campaign, while Frederick had instead simply—and 
effectively—done just as D’Argenson had predicted: ‘what he has to do.’  
 
Why did Frederick invade Silesia and what did it really mean? We have already looked at the 
symbolic meaning of this act. But what just seems to be a mere act of aggression, actually 
discloses Frederick’s greatest quality, which made him an incomparable ruler to any other of 
his age: Frederick the Great personified the raison d’etat and came to exemplify the rational 
use of state power for the creation of a completely new standard of responsible kingship. Let 
us examine in order of increasing importance the ways in which Frederick’s unique sense of 
kingship manifested itself. 
 
Shrewd New Strategies and New Visions of a ‘Reasons of State’ 
 
Raison d’etat3 is an expression that was made popular by Cardinal Richelieu’s Testament 
Politique (c.1640)4 and consists in the following crucial concept penned by him: 
 
The public interest ought to be the sole objective of the prince and his councilors, or, at least, 
both are obliged to have it foremost in mind, and preferred to all private gain.  It is impossible 
to overestimate the good which a prince and those serving him can do if they follow this 
principle, and one can hardly imagine the evils which befall a state if private interest is 
preferred to the public good and actually gains ascendancy. 
(Du Plessis, 1961, p.76) 
 
Despite Louis XIV was raised politically by Cardinal Richelieu, he quickly departed from 
Richelieu’s principle. His policy throughout his reign was the attainment of la gloire, which 
he believed to be the duty of kings. In reality, this specious term was but an irrepressible zeal 
for self-aggrandizement. When he invaded Holland in 1672 he relied too heavily on his 
overwhelming might, without calculating the effects of his offensive to its fullest extent and 
not displaying much foresight of the military, political, and financial consequences for 
France. Undoubtedly, France was the most powerful state in Europe, yet despite its initial, 
devastating victories, all of Louis’s gains were eventually lost by the end of his reign (Peace 
of Ryswick 1697, and Treaty of Utrecht 1713), and on his deathbed he blamed his bellicose 
                                                 
3
 Friedrich Meinecke regarded Machiavelli as the inventor of ‘reason of state’; but in my opinion he did 
not take into account that Machiavelli’s implacable speculative precepts were firstly for the purpose of 
a ruler’s supremacy—an individual ruler.  The first treatise on the concept of ‘reason of state’ was 
written by Giovanni Botero (1544-1617) in his Della Ragion di Stato of 1589; with it, he wished to 
clarify a concept that had originated in Spain and that had been current throughout the second half of 
the sixteenth century, though it had never been systematized.  Richelieu’s Raison d’Etat, on the other 
hand, introduced the thoroughly modern concept of the ‘public good’, which resurfaced in Britain a 
generation later with Hobbes—in an odd mixture of tyrannical power for the public good—and Locke, 
on whom Frederick formed his political doctrine. 
 
4
 It was never intended for publication but as a series of principles for Louis XIII’s guidance.  It was 
probably assembled after his death (1642) in 1646 by one or more of his secretaries drawn from 
manuscripts and his direct dictation.  The work was first published in 1688 in Amsterdam and has been 
contested ever since as spurious, because no fewer than seventeen manuscript copies survive, of which 
no two agree.  After countless debates—Voltaire, too, doubted its authorship—and much research, its 
authenticity was definitively established in 1880, though it is acknowledged that the text is not in any 
sort of final form. 
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temperament for much of the misfortunes which had befallen France; when he drafted his 
instructions for his heir, his great-grandson Louis XV, the tone was a far cry from the 
ostentatious days when he was frenetically seeking la gloire: ‘Always prefer peace to the 
hazards of war, and remember that the most brilliant victory is too dearly bought at the 
expense of your subjects’ blood.’ (Gooch, 1956, p.27)  
 
Frederick was different. He possessed an acute practical sense, quite unequalled in his time, 
which was only to be found in later figures such as Metternich, Talleyrand, and then 
Bismarck—political men who came of age after the French Revolution. In a memorandum to 
his Foreign Minister Podewils in July 1740, he displayed an astonishing grasp of practical 
considerations, calculating all the possible outcomes and complications that could arise from 
his annexation of Silesia. 
 
If we wait till Saxony and Bavaria start hostilities, we could not prevent the aggrandizement 
of the former which is wholly contrary to our interests. If we act at once, we keep her in 
subjection and by cutting off the supply of horses prevent her from moving. England and 
France are foes. If France meddles in the affairs of the Empire England could not allow it, so I 
can always make a good alliance with one or the other. England could not be jealous of my 
getting Silesia, which would do her no harm, and she needs allies. Holland will not care, all 
the more since the loans of the Amsterdam business world secured on Silesia will be 
guaranteed. If we cannot arrange with England and Holland we can certainly make a deal with 
France, who cannot frustrate our designs and will welcome the abasement of the Imperial 
house. Russia alone might cause us trouble. Next spring we shall have no one barring our 
path; thus if Russia wishes to attack us she may be sure she will have the Swedes on her 
hands and find herself between a hammer and the anvil. If the Empress lives, the Duke of 
Kurland, who has rich possessions in Silesia, will want me to preserve them and we can bribe 
the leading counselors. If she dies, the Russians will be so occupied with their domestic 
problems that they will have no time for foreign affairs. In any case an ass laden with gold for 
St. Petersburg is a possibility. All this leads to the conclusion that we must occupy Silesia 
before the winter and then negotiate. When we are in possession we can negotiate with 
success. (quoted in Gooch, 1947, p.5). 
 
It was necessary to quote a large passage of this remarkable memorandum because it shows 
the very different nature of government between a ruler such as Louis XIV, who full of 
vainglorious and deceiving confidence just hired his best general (Condé) and rashly overran 
Holland, and Frederick, who before invading Silesia displayed an acumen in weighing all the 
choices of the course of action that is just shy of prodigious. His rationality, a gift of his age 
no doubt, allowed him to understand that in a Europe deeply divided, he could find allies 
ignoring likes or dislikes—state interest alone must decide instead. His rationality also gave 
him an insight into the wider significance of his actions that any other ruler would envy: ‘This 
[Silesian campaign] is of the greatest consequence for Europe, the signal for the complete 
transformation of the old political system.’ (quoted in Gooch, 1947, p.170)  
 
Carving Prussia Out of the Reich as its New ‘German’ Heir 
 
Frederick’s perspicacity was just one of the differences, which made him such an effective 
ruler.  His mighty pragmatism made him the most brilliant military commander of the 
century. On January 25, 1758 Cardinal de Bernis, France’s new foreign minister, wrote in his 
diary an entry in which we can gather the complete disorganization of all the European 
powers: ‘I agree to the interest that we have in not allowing the King of Prussia to become the 
dictator of Germany; but do we believe the Courts of France, Vienna, Sweden, Russia, 
Saxony, Bavaria, etc., remaining united, will not hold the King of Prussia more in awe than 
armies acting ill, badly commanded, and in no way concerting one with another?’ (De Bernis, 
1901, p.139) Frederick, then, we learn second hand, had the best-organized and best-led 
troops in Europe. In fact, Tim Blanning points out the confusion and the ill-fated arrangement 
of the European alliance against Prussia during the Seven Years War. 
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The ‘renversement des alliances’ engineered by Kaunitz in 1756 may have been a diplomatic 
triumph, but politically it was a disaster. By allying Austria with the French hereditary enemy, 
it allowed Frederick to step forward as the saviour of German liberty. The traditional but still 
vital concept of the German nation represented by the hierarchical Reich now increasingly 
made way for a concept that was more cultural, more Prussian, more Protestant and more 
north German. (Blanning, 2002, p.310) 
 
In other words, not only was Frederick holding his ground against the forces of most of 
continental Europe combined, he was forging a new, legitimizing identity for Prussia, which 
made it, for the first time in its history—and destined to be fully realized over a century 
later—a viable, German alternative to Austria.   
 
The reversal of alliances that allied France together with Hapsburg Austria for the first time in 
over 250 years of bitter enmity, would not have occurred if d’Argenson, who was the last 
anti-Hapsburg Frenchman, and who became foreign minister in 1745, had not fallen in 
disgrace in 1755 (since, as we read earlier in his words, he believed Frederick’s Prussia 
should have been France’s friend and not its foe ‘for the whole duration of his reign’). 
Instead, Cardinal de Bernis succeeded him and negotiated with Kaunitz, thus reversing the 
immemorial hostility with the Hapsburgs. De Bernis eventually became secretary for foreign 
affairs on 27 June 1757. To de Bernis’ credit, though, it must be pointed out that he regarded 
the alliance with Austria as a provisional measure and never believed France should go to war 
next to Austria; but he was later undermined by courtly personages sympathetic to Maria 
Theresa. 
 
[…] it was imperative for the French to neutralize the continent, so that they could 
concentrate on the all important naval and colonial theatres. As Austria was the only 
continental power to pose a military threat to France, an alliance would bring security. But if 
the French conception of the alliance was essentially defensive, the Austrians intended to use 
it offensively, to win back Silesia and reduce Frederick the Great’s Prussia to its old rank as 
just another middling German state. 
(Blanning, 2002, p.392) 
 
And that alliance, Blanning claims in The Culture of Power and the Power of Culture, was 
the fatal mistake of France in the eighteenth century. Frederick was content to do his duty as 
he saw it, to plan and labor primarily for the welfare of his state, and to place wider 
considerations of European balances of power as secondary.  As it turned out, this was the 
most successful conduct: making raison d’etat his first prerogative proved best in the context 
of the age. In his book on Machiavellianism, Meinecke explains that the eighteenth century 
was politically the most disjointed century of the modern period. In it, he claimed, the old 
religious and clerical forces, which had previously bound European states together had 
waned. At the same time, the capitalist relationships which later would bind certain states 
together for economic reasons were not yet in place; Mercantilism, in which each state made 
itself economically as self-contained as possible, still predominated. ‘Never was the isolation 
of the power-State carried so far as in this last century of the ancien régime […] and this 
passed over from European expediency to the special expediency of the individual States. 
Frederick’s various interventions in European politics after 1740 accelerated this process.’ 
(Meinecke, 1957, p.321) The same view is shared by Gooch, with a different but equally 
interesting slant: 
 
That Frederick had no vision of a European system or a concert of the powers is not 
surprising in the eighteenth century. The medieval idea of a Respublica Christiana was dead 
and no alternative formula of unification had been found. […] Yet he was no more a 
nationalist than an internationalist, for nationalism in our modern sense is the child of the 
French Revolution. Born into a Germany that, as Metternich said of Italy, was a mere 
geographical expression, he never dreamed of a nation state under a Prussian or any other 
German head. (Gooch, 1947, p.107). 
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Frederick’s New Concept of Sovereignty 
 
These remarks make Frederick’s style of rule even more remarkable, because it was not 
supported by a utopian vision of a universally unified Europe, as for example, a figure like 
emperor Frederick II of Hohenstaufen had in the thirteenth century; Frederick the Great was 
content to do his duty as he saw it, to plan and labor for the welfare of his state alone. 
Meinecke also points out with great acumen that the struggles for questions of freedom, 
which were unleashed by the French Revolution and which split Europe into conservative and 
liberal camps, were still non-existent; and that thus, ‘Frederick was right: the isolated States 
were still only knit together by the effects of their own raison d’etat.’ (Meinecke, 1957, 
p.322) It is for this reason, that Meinecke appropriately refers to Frederick as both the most 
modern and farsighted ruler of his day and devotes to him the longest section of his book; he 
envisages him as the ruler who had the greatest impact on the modern principles of the state: 
 
Frederick’s mode of thinking and expressing himself [‘first servant of the State’] does 
indicate a movement in the direction of modern thought […] it [also] represents a movement 
towards the modern State, because it was Frederick’s State that first created the fixed and 
definite form within which it was possible for a mere population to become welded together 
into a real people and nation with its own vital will. 
(Meinecke, 1957, p.308) 
 
By far the most important and revolutionary aspect of Frederick’s kingship was his claim—
and his own view of himself—that he was the ‘first servant of the state’. There are numerous 
anecdotes, lovingly recounted by many in his day, of Frederick’s unconcern for his own 
self—from sleeping nonchalantly on haystacks, to answering to his doctor, who demanded 
that Frederick rest for his own good, that ‘he had his duties and the doctor his own’. But the 
political and historical significance of his approach are enormous, and transcend these 
anecdotes, which at best make him amiable to us. We have seen analyzed in detail the 
modernity of his stance toward rule in the European context of his day; but we can draw 
further instruction from Frederick’s own rationalization of his role as the ‘first servant of the 
state’ in the order he gave to his minister Count Finckenstein at the outbreak of the Seven 
Years’ War: 
 
If it should really be my fate to be taken prisoner, then I forbid anyone to have the smallest 
concern for my person […] If such misfortune should befall me I shall hold my brother, my 
ministers and generals, responsible with their heads for seeing that neither a province nor a 
ransom is offered for my release, but that the war is continued and every advantage seized, 
just as if I had never existed in the world. 
(Meinecke, 1957, p.281) 
 
If we compare Frederick’s attitude toward kingship with that of other rulers who possessed 
the old ideal of personal grandeur, the difference is astonishing: when François I was captured 
by Charles V’s army at Pavia in 1525, for example—a confrontation that Francis had 
provoked with his anachronistic yearning for chivalric conquests—he was brought to Spain as 
prisoner and did not hesitate to exchange his two sons as ransom for his release!5   
 
Conclusion 
 
Frederick’s unconcern for himself was far more than astute, practical sense among outmoded 
kings who believed they were the state. For over a millennium in Europe the status of 
kingship possessed a peculiar sacrality, as a complex set of rituals developed around the 
king’s person. The sacralization of the king’s body was the outward manifestation of the early 
                                                 
5
 This was the ‘heroic’ gesture of the “last chivalric King of France”, as Nobert Elias called him—a 
man, whose own interests, to be sure, far superseded the wellbeing of his kingdom.  See Nobert Elias, 
The Court Society, (1983), Oxford: Basil Blackwell.  
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medieval concept that the king was the state personified.6 Frederick despised this ‘religio 
regis’; his view of being the ‘first servant of the state’ prefigured the modern politician whose 
office is chiefly one of service. To Frederick’s great credit, he was King of Prussia at a time 
when the representational culture around kings and the high aristocracy was still very much 
alive, even though Jürgen Habermas has convincingly shown in his Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere, that the eighteenth century witnessed a waning of the 
sacralization of power and of its longstanding legitimizing allegorical iconography, as it 
underwent a general and profound transformation toward literalism and understatement, 
because of the emergence of a ‘public sphere’, for whom allegory was uncongenial.7  
 
Frederick’s disregard for his dynasty in favor of his people, evident in his refusal to produce 
an heir of his own, his idea that ‘free individuals combine to form the people of a state, and 
voluntarily transfer their self-determination to a ruling authority appointed by them’ (Ritter, 
1968, p.68), his conviction that men ‘in the final analysis are equal’ and that ‘high birth is 
chimerical’ (Ritter, 1968, p.68), and, once again and most of all, that he was the first servant 
of the state—a ‘servant’ with uncommon charisma, determination, and military skill, make 
the panegyrics quoted at the beginning of this essay utterly convincing. As Meinecke pointed 
out, ‘who could fail to perceive the great principles [honor and interest of state] and decisions 
of Frederick’s life?’ (Meinecke, 1957, p.281) 
 
And so, Frederick according to Ritter represented ‘the apogee and at the same time the end of 
his epoch’ (Ritter, 1968, p.175), for the collapse of the Prussian monarchy in 1806, exactly 
twenty years after his death, shows that a man of Frederick’s caliber was still indispensable 
for the newest of the European powers. And yet Frederick himself, with typical political 
humility, wrote in his Political Testament of 1752 that ‘if the destinies of any State are to be 
solid and sure, then its fortunes ought not to be dependent on the good or bad qualities of one 
man.’ (quoted in Meinecke, 1957, p.338)  
 
But with Frederick William III at the disastrous Battle of Jena-Auerstedt there was no 
personality or no raison d’etat that was capable of compelling such destiny, for Frederick ’der 
Einzige’ was indeed unique as a man, a ruler, and as an agent in Prussia’s history. 
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